Leverage you can hold.

Tokenized stocks lack the volatility the onchain audience wants, and regular perpetual exchanges carry heavy regulation and fund every position from the company’s own liquidity. F-Pools are permissionless perpetual markets: anyone can fund the liquidity, and anyone can trade them.

The pool tokens are ordinary ERC-20s, so they open up DeFi uses that are not possible with a perp account on someone else’s exchange. They were also built so that Folios can later hold them, offering leveraged long Folios to build price and social momentum.

A Uniswap v4 hook that replaces the curve.

F-Pools are a Uniswap v4 hook. Swaps route through normal v4 infrastructure, but the hook replaces the AMM curve entirely. Select a step to see what it does.

Built on Uniswap v4Step 3 of 5

  3. The hook replaces the AMM curve entirely. Before each trade it syncs the feed, marks the target price, and fills at that price.

03 Uniswap v4 hookF-Pools hook

The hook replaces the AMM curve entirely. Before each trade it syncs the feed, marks the target price, and fills at that price.

LPs are the other side

LPs deposit USDG into the hook and receive fungible shares of LP equity, the USDG left after trader claims. When traders profit, LP equity falls. When traders lose, it grows. There is no impermanent-loss math, just direct exposure to aggregate trader PnL.

Solvent by construction

Trader claims can never exceed the USDG in the hook. As claims grow relative to backing, the effective multiplier falls toward zero, so an up-move can only transfer a fraction of what remains. There is no price reset and no discretionary intervention.

Your wallet is the position

A token such as NVDAx5 is bought with USDG in one swap through any v4 router. There is no margin account, no per-wallet liquidation price, and no funding payments. It is also not the stock itself: it is synthetic.

Leverage is up to ×, not always ×.

The multiplier depends on the state of the book. With deep LP backing and few traders long, leverage runs near its cap. As more traders pile in, it steps down so claims can never exceed the backing. The app shows the live effective leverage at all times.

The simulator starts on the worked example: LPs have deposited $10,000, a trader buys $1,000, and NVDA rises 10%. The multiplier is about 4.5×, the mark goes from $200 to about $291, and the trader’s tokens are worth about $1,455.

NVDAx5Marks at $200
LP equity $10,000 Trader claims $1,000
Leverage in use4.55× of 5×
Effective leverage4.55×Cap 5×, not a promise
NVDAx5 mark after$290.91+45.5% on $200
Trader value$1,455+$455
LP equity after$9,545-$455

Trader gains and LP losses net to zero before fees. Capacity, the largest up-move before the solvency bound, is 220% here. Illustrative.

It stops near zero value, not zero exposure.

If NVDA fell 20% on a day when effective leverage was 5×, the target price would be P × (1 + 5 × −0.20) = 0. In practice leverage steps down as the book shifts, which softens the path. The honest statement is that a large enough adverse move can leave the token worth almost nothing. “No margin call” means no one closes your position for you. It does not mean the position cannot lose nearly everything.

Start99.0% the stock75.0% the 5× tokenStartFalls 10%Rises 10%

The token compounds on every oracle update, so a choppy market erodes it even when the stock ends flat. These tokens reward conviction on direction over short horizons. They are not buy-and-forget.

The known risks.

The mitigations below are in progress, and the protocol will not market around these risks.

  • NVDA moves on Nasdaq before Chainlink posts onchain. A fast trader who buys at the stale price and sells after the update extracts money from LPs. Planned mitigations: a spread around the oracle mark, a fee that grows with oracle age, and/or two-step order execution. One or more ships before meaningful LP capital is invited in. Uniswap v3 TWAP oracles can partly remedy this, but introduce other risks.

Who pays what.

Trades pay a swap fee on the USDG side, split between the protocol and the LP pool. Adding backing may pay a mint fee. Withdrawing pays a redeem fee that is largely retained for the remaining LPs. These are the planned defaults, and exact basis points are set per market at deploy.

ActionFeeWhere it goes
Long or close a long (swap)0.50% of the tradeHalf to the protocol, half stays with LPs
Add LP (mint)0.30%All to the protocol. The first deposit that opens the pool is free
Remove LP (redeem)0.30%Stays with the LPs who remain. If the last LP exits, it goes to the protocol

The formulas, in full.

An F-Pool token compounds from its own prior mark. It does not restate the underlying’s dollar price. L is read before the oracle move, and a repeated oracle price does not change P.

Pricing
r      = (P_oracle_now − P_oracle_last) / P_oracle_last
P_next = P × (1 + L × r)
Leverage curve

Trader claims and LP equity determine the multiplier for the next oracle print. X_trader is the F-Pool supply held by traders, Y is hook USDG after accrued protocol fees, and L_max is the configured cap. Leverage approaches the cap when no trader claim is open, and approaches zero as claims consume LP equity. For a solvent, zero-fee book, LPE + T = Y, so L = L_max × (1 − T / Y).

T      = X_trader × P
LPE    = Y − T
L      = L_max × LPE / (LPE + T)
PnL and solvency

An oracle update moves trader claims and LP equity by equal and opposite amounts. If a discrete oracle gap would make T greater than Y, the mark clamps to Y / X_trader, LP equity becomes zero, and new longs pause. The next multiplier is zero until longs exit or new LP capital arrives.

ΔT   = T × L × r
ΔLPE = −ΔT

T ≤ Y
P ≤ Y / X_trader
Capacity

Capacity is the maximum underlying up-move before the solvency bound applies. At a 5× cap it approaches 20% as trader claims become much larger than LP equity.

capacity = Y / (L_max × T)

Leverage inside the index.

Because NVDAx5 is a normal ERC-20, a Folio basket can hold it. An “AI Infrastructure” Folio can be NVDA plus TSLAx50 plus HOOD in one ticker: leverage inside the index, not a link out to a perp account on someone else’s exchange.